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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

In light of this liberal trend, the appellate division, second
department, recently decided Bartolone v. Niagara Car & Truck
Rentals, Inc.50° Plaintiff was the owner and operator of a car
involved in a collision with an automobile owned by a corporate
defendant and operated by an individual defendant. Personal
injury actions, brought by passengers in plaintiff's car, against
plaintiff and defendants resulted in judgments against the three
defendants. Plaintiff thereupon brought an action against the
owner and operator of the other vehicle. Defendants contended
that they should be permitted to plead res judicata, since the
issues of negligence and contributory negligence were determined
in the other actions. In a memorandum opinion, the court held
that Glaser v. Huette "is presently the law of New York and
we apply it to this case."
Collateral Estoppel:

Court of Claims interprets DeWitt
requirements.

In Alberto v. State,"'2 the court of claims was afforded the
opportunity to interpret the requirements for the use of collateral
estoppel, as posited by B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,"'3 and
Cummings v. Dresher.154 Claimant had been involved in an
accident near the Tappan Zee Bridge, where his car skidded
into an automobile operated by one Siccardi. Siccardi, and the
passengers in his car, brought a personal injury action against
claimant in federal court. There claimant sought to prove that
the State had been negligent by maintaining the road in a
dangerous condition. However, his offer of proof was rejected
on the ground that the State was not a party to the action, and
could not, therefore, defend itself. The jury found claimant
negligent and returned a verdict for the plaintiffs.
In the instant action, the State moved to dismiss claimant's
assertion of negligence under CPLR 3211(a) (5) on the ground
that the findings in the federal court were res judicata as to the
issues presented.
In rejecting the State's contention, the court reasoned that
DeWitt limited the application of collateral estoppel to cases in
which a party has had the opportunity to present all evidence
available in order to exonerate himself. It was said that
15029 App. Div. 2d 689, 288 N.Y.S.2d 312 (2d Dep't 1968).

1

Id. at 690, 288 N.Y.S2d at 313.

15256 Misc. 2d 235, 289 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Ct. C1. 1968),
20319

N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).

For a

further discussion of DeWitt, see The Quarterly Survey of New York
Practice, 42 ST. JoHrN's L. REv. 128, 150 (1967).
154 18 N.Y2d 105, 218 N.E2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1966).
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'[w]here a full opportunity has been afforded to a party to the prior
action and he has failed to prove his freedom from liability or to
establish liability or culpability on the part of another, there is no
reason for permitting him to retry these issues.' 155
Clearly, claimant was not afforded the opportunity to show
that it was the State's negligence which forced his car to skid.
Moreover, the State could not be made a party to the former action
since its liability can only be determined by the court of claims,
which has exclusive jurisdiction thereof.
Collateral Estoppel: DeWitt principle held inapplicable in
fellow passenger situation.
In B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,56 the Court of Appeals, for
the first time, allowed the offensive use of collateral estoppel.
Two requirements were posited:
1. it must be unquestioned that the original action had been
vigorously defended, and;
57
2. the second cause of action must be derivative of the first.
While the Court did not explicitly, define "derivative action,"
the editors of the Survey have assumed it to encompass the owneroperator relationship.
The question left unanswered by DeWitt was whether a
passenger-driver relationship would be sufficiently derivative to
invoke collateral estoppel. An affirmative answer to this question
logically extends the offensive use of the doctrine to the train
wreck hypothetical. 58

10 19 N.Y.Zd at 146, 225 N.E.2d at 198, 278 N.Y.S2d at 600, quoting
Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 107-08, 218 N.E.2d 688, 689, 271
N.Y.S.2d 976, 977 (1966).
15619 NY.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
'57 For a ufrther discussion of the DeWitt holding, see The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 128, 150 (1967).
158A rain crashes with 100 passengers aboard. 50 passengers in separate
negligence actions are denied recovery. The fifty-first passenger, possibly
because he is an infant, is awarded a verdict from a sympathetic jury.
The defendant could not use the fifty adjudications of its innocence against
the remaining forty-nine plaintiffs, since they had not litigated the issue
However, a broad interpretation
of defendant's negligence themselves.
of the doctrine of collateral estoppel could allow these 49 plaintiffs to
receive sunnary judgment on the issue of defendant's negligence, based
upon the single recovery by the infant plaintiff. See 32 BRooK., L. REv.
428, 431 (1966); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the
Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. Rsv. 281 (1957).

